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COMMENT
of migratory waterfowl."8 But it has been suggested that the
Federal Government could again gain the cooperation of the
states in respect to fair resident and nonresident hunting
privilege laws by denying to noncooperating states the right
to share in the distribution of Pittman-Robertson funds,4 7
much as the Federal Government administers federal grants
for the construction of state highways. Since Pittman-Robert-
son funds are derived from the sale of federal migratory
waterfowl hunting stamps and from excise taxes on hunting
arms and ammunition, the Federal Government may justi-
fiably feel that to deny to nonresident hunters the right to
shoot waterfowl in those states particularly fortunate in be-
ing located in favorable flyways would be unjust and therefore
a reason to withhold distribution of such funds.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - IMPLIED CONTRACTS -
LIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPALITY THEREON
T HE EXTENT to which a public corporation may be held on
an improperly executed contract was recently considered
by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Northwestern Sheet
& Iron Work8 v. Sioux County,' which placed squarely before
46 See, e.g., Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1918) ; Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896). Contra: State of Kansas v. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127 (1877).
See Corwin, Game Protection and the Constitution, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 619
(1916): "Suppose, therefore, we concede the proprietorship of the state* in its
wild game to the fullest extent, what then is the legal character of the migra-
tion of game from one state to another, considered in their aspect of successive
proprietors of such game? Obviously it is that of transfer of property across
state lines from one legal person to another, that is, 'Commerce.' True, the
transfer is not by contract between the legal persons involved, but rather by
the operation of a kind of legal prescription; yet it is none the less a legal
transfer, and it is 'among states.' Nor is it a.mere casual occurence, as for in-
stance where a dog might elect to change masters, but it is a regularly recurrent,
seasonal and predictable process, which, even though not susceptible of 'regula-
tion' in many senses of the word, certainly ought to be capable of being pro-
tected by the government of the larger community which is benefitted by it."
47 50 Stat. 917 (1937), 16 U.S.C. §§669-669J (1940).
136 N.W. 2d 605 .'N.D. 1949). The county contended that it was not hound
by orders of the county, commissioners made in their individual capacity before
the advertisements were even made. They further contended that notice for bids
was not published the required length of time, nor was there compliance with
the lowest bid statute. The plaintiff pleaded estoppel and ratification, comming-
ling two theories of recovery, and claimed the "agreed and reasonable value,"
but the defendant made no motion for election of theories. The county unsuccess-
fully tried to distinguish between the case of Stark County v. City of Dickinson,
56 N.D. 371, 217 N.W. 525 (1928), which allowed assumpsit, and Backhaus v.
Lee, 49 N.D. 821, 194 N.W. 887 (1923), a case in equity.
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the court the question of recovery on implied contract. In the
district court, recovery was denied after the court expressly
found that the contract was illegal and void due to the county's
failure to advertise for bids for the required statutory period,
2
before letting the contract to the plaintiff. On appeal to the
supreme court it was held that the decision below be reversed
and recovery allowed despite the defective execution of the
contract. The court indicated that a substantial and good
faith attempt had been made by the board of county com-
missioners to comply with the statutory requirements for the
advertisements of bids even though the bids were actually
advertised for only 17 days instead of the 30 days required
by statute, i.e., that the defect was merely one of procedure.
The court found that since the county had the power to con-
tract and had received the materials for a lawful purpose and
did not, contend that the goods were not worth the amount
agreed, then in "equity and good conscience" the county must
pay the reasonable value of the goods.
The result is in undoubted accord with the trend of recent
decisions elsewhere, yet the opinion fails to make clear the con-
tractual basis of recovery - that is, whether recovery was
allowed on the express contract, on a contract implied in fact,
or in quasi contract - an omission found in many of the de-
cisions which have been concerned with this question. After
examining express and implied in fact contract recovery, the
court declared that "... equity and good conscience require
that the county pay the reasonable value . . ." in language
connotative of quasi contractual recovery.8
Contracts to which municipal corporations are a party are
governed by the same rules of contract law that apply to any
other contract. Yet the municipalities are creatures of the
state, and their ability to bind themselves in contracts is
limited by the necessity that the contracts must be in pur-
suance of either the powers expressly granted to them by
2 Sections 24-0504, 24-0509 and 11-1126, N.D. Rev. Code (1943) require ad-
vertisement for bids for four successive weeks and that the first advertisement
shall have been published at least thirty days before the opening of the
bids. Sioux County advertised for only three weeks and the first publication
was only seventeen days before the letting of the contract.
8 The overworked phrase of "equity and good conscience" has seen long
service in the opinions and just what it signifies is not clear. The courts find
use for it when denying and allowing recovery. The :defendant in the Sioux
County case on petition for rehearing inquired why "equity and good conscience"
did not require that the taxpayer get protection from ultra vires contracts.
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legislative or constitutional provisions, those implied from
the powers expressly granted, and those essential to the
carrying out of the declared objects and purposes of the cor-
poration.4 Municipal corporations can act only within the
scope of the powers expressly granted them and those powers
necessarily implied therefrom,5 and it is a familiar rule of
construction that the legislative enactments granting such
powers are construed strictly against the municipality.6
Where a contract is truly ultra vires, the municipality hav-
ing absolutely no power to make such a contract, nearly all
jurisdictions agree that there can be no recovery on either
the theory of express or implied contract.7 In Williams v.
4 Minot Special School Dist. v. Olaness, 53 N.D. 683, 208 N.W. 968 (1926);
Village of Ashley v. Ashley Lumber Co., 40 N.D. 515, 169 N.W. 87 (1918);
Stern v. City of Fargo, 18 N.D. 289, 122 N.W. 403 (1909); 2 McQuillen,
Municipal Corporations 592 et. seq. (3d ed. 1949). For collections of cases on
municipal liability on implied contracts, see notes 154 A.L.R. 356 (1945), 110
A.L.R. 154 (1937), 84 A.L.R. 937 (1933).
5 Arms v. Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 145 N.E. 407 (1924); Village of Carthage v.
Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 25 N.E. 480 (1890). The powers implied must be
indispensable to the declared purposes and objects of the corporation and not
simply convenient. See Stern v. City of Fargo, 18 N.D. 289, 296, 122 N.W.
403, 406 (1909).
6 Barnard v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N.E. 384 (1925); see Lang v. City of
Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 84, 228 N.W. 819, 822 (1930) (ambiguities resolved against
the municipality); North Fargo v. City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 597, 192 N.W. 977
(1923). North Dakota has indicated that county commissioners must act in a
formal manner to bind the county and-cannot do so by individual action. Rollette
State Bank v. Rollette County, 56 N.D. 571, 218 N.W. 637 (1928); 2 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations §788 (5th ed. 1911). The term municipal corporation
embraces cities and villages, #se North Fargo v. City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 597, 601,
192 N.W. 977, 978 (1923), while counties are properly quasi public corporations,
yet the law of municipal corporations applies equally to the latter. Some author-
ities describe the county as a municipal corporation. See People v. Board of
Sup'rs, 101 App. Div. 327, 91 N.Y. Supp. 948, 949 (1905); Restatement, Restitu-
tion §75, comment b (1937).
7 City of Phoenix v. Kidd, 54 Ariz. 75, 92 P.2d 513 (1939); City of Oakland
v. Key System, 64 Cal. App. 2d 427, 149 P.2d 195 (1944); Columbia Insurance
Co. v. Board of Educ., 185 Okla. 292, 91 P.2d 736 (1939); See Notes, 21-Neb. L.
Bull. 54 (1942), 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 64 (1932). Contra: Womack Rayburn Co. v.
Town of Worthington, 262 Ky. 710, 91 S.W.2d 13 (1936), 25 Geo. L. J. 758
(1937) (court declared that to refuse recovery would be to confess impotency
of the law to evert the city's wrongful conversion). Strictly speaking a contract
is ultra vires when it is substantively outside the scope of the corporate power.
Cooley, Municipal Corporations 248, 249 (1914), and in fact an ultra vires con-
tract is no contract at all. Westminister Water Co. v. City of Westminister,
98 Md. 551, 56 Atl. 990 (1904). The doctrine of ultra vires applies more strictly
to public than private corporations. See Baird v. Divide County, 58 N.D. 867, 877-
78, 228 N.W. 226, 230 (1929). For discussion of the ultra vires doctrine, see
Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires
Doctrine, 36 Yale L.J. 297 (1927). Some jurisdictions, including North Dakota,
distinguish between contracts which are ultra vires in the primary and those
in the secondary sense, Kotachevar v. North Fork Twp., 39 N.W.2d 107 (Minn.
1949) (quasi contract allowed on ultra ires contract in the secondary sense
though the dissent urged that the competitive bid requirment was mandatory
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City of Fargo,8 the court in discussing void contracts, cogently
summarized the effect of ultra vires on implied contractual re-
covery in declaring:
"A contract of the municipal corporation is ultra vires
when the corporation has no power under existing law under
any circumstances to enter into such a contract. An ultra vires
contract is wholly void and no recovery can be had against the
municipality thereon. The municipality cannot be estopped
to deny the validity of the contract, and no recovery can be
had on implied contract." 0
The recurring difficulty arises, however, where the muni-
cipality has the power to make the contract but fails to con-
form to constitutional or legislative requirements in enter-
ing into the agreement. Generally under such circumstances,
recovery on the basis of an implied contract is sought against
the municipal corporation. There is a wide split of authority
on municipal implied ex contractu liability where statutory
compliance is lacking, and as early as 1860 the chief justice
and the contract was thus ultra vires in the primary sense); Backhaus v.
Lee, 49 N.D. 821, 194 N.W. 887 (1923). A contract primarily ultra wires is one
which is not within the scope of the powers of the corporation to make under
any circumstances or for any purpose and a contract secondarily ultra vires is a
contract which the corporation had the right to execute, but with respect to
which there has been some irregularity or defect in the actual exercise of the
power, i.e., intra. wires. Mares v. Janutka, 196 Minn. 87, 264 N.W. 222, 20 Minn.
L. Rev. 564 (1936). It has been said that there are really three kinds of ultra
ires municipal contracts: (1) those prohibited, (2) those where the power to
make the contract is lacking, (3) those where statutory formalities are not
complied with. 16 Va. L. Rev. 628 (1936). Some authorities discuss recovery in
terms of substantial compliance, as did the North Dakota court in North-
western Sheet & Iron Works v. Sioux County, supra. People v. McDonough, 173
N.Y. 181, 65 N.E. 963 (1903). But see Peoples Bank v. School Dist., 3 N.D. 496,
57 N.W. 787 (1893) (the court here thought that the statute should be strictly
followed and said that "If the question is to depend upon the magnitude of the
departure from the statutory requirement it will be impossible to know where to
draw the line.") In North Dakota's initial case on the topic, Goose River Bank
v. Willow Lake School Twp., 1 N.D. 26, 44 N.W. 1002 (1890), it was held that
where a contract is expressly prohibited or declared void by statute one render-
ing services pursuant to such contract cannot recover from the municipality
under the contract or on quantum meruit. Accord: Hosmer v. Sheldon School
Dist., 4 N.D. 197, 59 N.W. 1035 (1894); Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School Dist.,
1 N.D. 479, 48 N.W. 363 (1890).
8 63 N.D. 183, 247 N.W. 46 (1933). The doctrine of implied contract is not
applicable to fasten liability upon a municipality for purely personal services.
Bailey v. King County, 21 Wash.2d 53, 149 P.2d 823 (1944), see note, 154
A.L.R. 356 (1945).
9 Id. at 202, 247 N.W. at 53. Yet, if the ultra wires contract has been fully
executed then ultra vires will constitute no defense, at least in "liberal" juris-
dictions such as Minnesota. State v. Clark, 116 Minn. 500, 134 N.W. 129 (1912);
Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 21$, 113 N.W. 271 (1907)..But cf. Hosmer v. Sheldon
School Dist., 4 N.D. 197, 59 N.W. 1035 (1894); Goose River Bank v. Willow
Lake School Twp., 1 N.D. 26, 44 N.W. 1002 (1890); Capital Bank of St. Paul v.
School Dist., 1 N.D. 479, 48 N.W. 363 (1890.).
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of the California Supreme Court described the decisions with-
out exaggeration as a "tangled web of contradictions, and it
is difficult to assert any proposition . . . for which adjudica-
tions on both sides may not be cited." "
RECOVERY ON CONTRACTS IMPLIED IN FACT
A large number of courts have failed as did the court in
the Sioux County case, to make the proper technical distinction
between contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in
law. The later type of contract is properly conterminous with
quasi contracts, 1 and the failure of the courts to so distinguish
has greatly added to the lack of judicial clarity.
Of great importance is the distinction made in most juris-
dictions between mandatory and directory statutory require-
ments. Where the statutory provision is a comparatively un-
important precautionary measure and can be construed to be
merely directory then there is no objection to allowing re-
covery. But where the provision is mandatory in nature and is
not complied with in forming the contract, the majority of
courts will deny recovery, 12 though there is irreconcilable dis-
10 Field, C. J., in Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 284 (1860). Three
early California cases have had controlling influences on municipal corporation
law and today form the basis of implied- contractual liability of the municipality.
San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 452 (1858); Argenti v. San
Francisco, supra; and Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 97 (1862). These cases
have been cited in a large number of subsequent decisions, including North
Dakota opinions, and in many instances improperly, this being due to the
broad assertions in San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, supra, to the effect
that a municipality is bound in contract on the same principles as an individual
or private corporation. However, this was modified by the Argenti case and over-
ruled in effect in the Zottman case. While the Zottman case represents the
majority view, Tooke, Lijability of Municipal Corporations, 47 Harv. L. Rev.
1143 (1943), most courts manage to reach a result in accord with the more
liberal view expressed in the Argenti case. For a review of the Argenti and
Zoltma-: cases, see Tooke, op. cit. supra, and Note, 21 Neb. L. Bull. 54 (1942).
The split of authority is between the more strict view adopted by California,
Ohio and New York, and the liberal view expressed by the Minnesota, Nebraska,
and Texas courts.
11 For the distinction between contracts implied in fact and those implied in
law, see American La France Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah, 115 F.2d
866 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Mathie v. Hancock, 78 Vt. 414, 63 Atl. 143 (1906). For an
example of the confusion on implied contract see Ohio Oil Co. v. Michigan City,
117 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1941).
12 Bartlett v. City of Lowell, 201 Mass. 151, 87 N.E. 195 (1909) (recovery
denied since to allow it would be to put "the seal of law upon a plain eva-
sion . . ."); Bluthenthal v. Town of Headland, 132 Ala. 249, 31 So. 87 (1901).
Where the contract is by an officer without authority there will be no implied
recovery, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 343 (1904). Distinctions are sometimes made between
proprietary and governmental types of contracts. Eau Claire Dells Improve-
ment Co. v. Eau Claire, 172 Wis. 240, 179 N.W. 2 (1920).
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agreement as to which statutes are directory and which are
mandatory.
Where the statute has been directed toward the form of the
contract, such as the requirement that the contract be in writ-
ing, recovery has been permitted despite lack of compliance,"
and also where a required resolution was not passed, 1' or
where proper publication of an ordinance was not made,1 5 or
a contract was not made in duplicate as required.- However,
the failure to authorize a contract by ordinance where re-
quired by statute is generally regarded as mandatory, 1 as are
competitive bids, 8 the requirement of a prior appropriation, 9
the conformance with constitutional debt limits, 2 0 and the in-
ability of city officials to have an interest in the contract.21
The basis for this conflicting maze of decisions is traceable
to the application of two different doctrines of public policy.
The courts denying recovery on implied contract proceed on
the theory that a statutory requirement when not complied
with negatives validity, and the allowance of recovery would
indirectly allow that which by statute cannot be done directly.
This view tends to support all regulations created to afford
the taxpayer protection.
The decisional results of the other type of cases indicate that
public policy requires the use of quasi contractual principles
is Gas Light Co. v. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 612, 30 S.W. 25 (1894). It seems, how-
ever, that the requirement of writing was intended to be as much a safeguard
as competitive bidding. See Note, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 64, 70 (1932).
'4 Forest City v. Orgill Bros., 87 Ark. 389, 112 S.W. 891 (1908).
'5 Moore v. City of New York, 75 N.Y. 238 (1878).
16 Saleno v. City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30 S.W. 190 (1895).
'7 Moseley Hospital v. Hall, 207 Ky. 644, 269 S.W. 1004 (1925); Bosard v.
City of Grand Forks, 13 N.D. 587, 102 N.W. 164 (1904) (held no implied contract
since it would override the law and destroy strongest safeguards of public
funds); Note, 21 Ky. L. Rev. 489, 490 (1933) (great weight declared to be that
no implied contract proper where there is failure to authorize by required ordi-
nance and procure sealed bids as well). Contra: Ward v. Town of Forest Grove,
20 Ore. 355, 25 Pac. 1020 (1891); Sluder v. City of San Antonio, 2 S.W.2d 841
(Tex. Comm. App. 1928) 7 Texas L. Rev. 172 (1928) (recovery allowed in face
of express restriction).
's Johnson County Savings Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W.
705 (1930); Restatement, Restitution §62 comment b (1937).
19 Empire Voting Mach. Co. v. Chicago, 267 Fed. 162 (7th Cir. 1921), 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 439 (1921); Roberts v. City of Fargo, 10 N.D. 230, 86 N.W. 726 (1901).
Contra: Houston v. Finn. 149 S.W.2d 1000 (Tex. Crim. App.) 20 Tex. L. Rev.
109 (1941).
20 Bartelson v. Int'l School Dist., 43 N.D. 253, 174 N.W. 78 (1919) (dissent
thought result served to "sustain plunder and theft.")
21 City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat. Bank, 153 V. 71, 149 S.E. 632 (1929) 16
Va. L. Rev. 628 (1930). Contra: Grand Island Gas Co. v. West, 28 Neb. 852, 45
N.W. 242 (1890).
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and recovery on a quantum meruit basis when the subject
matter of the contract is proper-and the taxpayer is still given
reasonable protection.
A harsh rule often invoked against recovery is that an in-
dividual contracts with the municipality at his own peril and
is conclusively presumed (i.e. a rule of law) to know the
limitations upon its power, and also upon the authority of its
officers in making them.22 However, there evists an ameliora-
tive presumption of validity of the contract and that all things
required for its validity have been performed.2 3 Occasionally
the defense that the parties are in pari delicto is interposed,
but the courts ordinarily give it slight recognition.2 '
Municipalities are generally held liable on the theory of
ratification provided the contract was within general cor-
porate powers, although it was in some way defective due to
irregular execution, 25 or because the officer or agent who exe-
cuted it on behalf of the corporation had not the requisite
authority. 26 Thus the courts will allow ratification of the con-
tract if it is of a proper nature and the ratification is formally
made,27 but generally ratification will not be implied.28 Con-
tracts wholly beyond the power of the municipality, i.e. those
ultra vires are never ratifiable.2 9 North Dakota has expressly
22 Reams v. Cooley, 171 Cal. 510, 152 Pac. 293 (1915), 1 Corn. L. Q. 311
(1916); Williams v. Fargo, 63 N.D. 183, 247 N.W. 46 (1933); Peoples Bank v.
School Dist. No. 52, 3 N.D. 496, 57 N.W. 787 (1893); Roberts v. City of Fargo,
10 N.D. 230, 86 N.W. 726 (1901); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 1777 (5th ed.
1911). The maxim that every man is presumed to know the law, ignorantia juris
non excusat, has been criticized and instead it has been argued that one should
have only to look to the ostensible power to make the contract. Wentink v.
Passaic County, 66 NJ. 65, 48 Atl. 609 (1901), nor should an individual be
expected to "study a treatise on the law of corporations." Bissel v. Michigan
Ry., 22 N.Y. 258, 281 (1860).
23 Johnson County Savings Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W.
705 (1930); Missoula Street Ry. v. City of Missoula, 47 Mont. 85, 130 Pac. 771
(1913). A distinction between executory and executed contracts is sometimes
made. San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 (1858).
24 See St. Paul v. Dual Parking Meter Co., 39 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1949) for
a successful application of the defense.
25 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 1154, n.2 (5th ed. 1911). A contract to
violate the charter or to bargain or restrict the free exercise of legislative
discretion vested in the municipality or its officers is void.
26 Everts v. Rose Grove Twp., 77 Iowa 37, 41 N.W. 478 (1889); New Haven v.
Weston, 87 Vt. 7, 86 Ati. 996 (1914).
27 Shulse v. City of Mayville, 283. Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 642 (1937).
28 Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 46, 54 (1950).
29 See Gosserand v. City of Gretna, 9 La. App. 544, 121 So. 208, 211 (1928).
Some courts confuse ratification with quasi contracts. Note, 36 Mich. L. Rev.
855 (1938).
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recognized ratification as an accepted mode of making good a
contract that has only some secondary defect.8o
CONTRACTS IMPLIED IN LAW: QUASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY
The task of reconciling the cases concerned with quasi con-
tractual liability of the municipal or public corporation has
been described as completely hopeless by one authority.3' How-
ever the courts are in agreement that where the contractual
irregularity deprives the municipality of a protection or safe-
guard there can be no recovery,3 2 nor can there be quasi con-
tractual recovery where the restrictions are mandatory.33 Like
contracts implied in fact, recovery for benefits conferred is
permissible where the contract was made in good faith and
was within the power of the municipality and the failure of
the agreement was only due to non-compliance with directory
provisions." It is essential to quasi contract recovery that the
plaintiff show that the defendant municipality has acquired
tangible benefits in the form of money, services, or materials,
and that it would be inequitable not to compensate the
plaintiff.3 5 Where a statute has forbidden any "contract, agree-
ment or obligation" to be entered into except by ordinance, it
so Stark County v. City of Dickinson, 56 N.D. 371, 17 N.W. 525 (1928); Gil-
lespie v. Common School Dist. No. 8, 56 N.D. 194, 216 N.W. 564 (1927) (ratifica-
tion need not be alleged in complaint).
a' Knowlton, The Quasi-Contractual Obligation of Municipal Corporations, 9
Mich. L. Rev. 671 (1911). A quasi contract is really no contract at all. The
very liberal allowances of quasi contract recovery in Minnesota is traced in
Kotschevar v. North Fork Twp., 39 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1949) and criticized
in an erudite dissent.
82 Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts 9161 (1913). Accord: Probst v.
City of Menasha, 245 Wis. 90, 13 N.W.2d'504 (1944). Exceptional circumstances
may admit a circumvention of the statute. See Note, 31 Yale L. J. 779 (1922),
sharply criticizing the case of Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Atlanta, 27 Ga. App. 643, 110
S.E. 408 (1922).
83 Where the municipality has the power to so contract and has paid, then no
action will lie to recover hack the money expended. See Federal Paving Corp.
v. City of Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 658, 286 N.W. 546, 547 (1939).
84 American La France Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 183 Miss. 207, 184 So. 620
(1938), 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 494 (1939); Harm v. School Dist. No. 2, 139 Neb.
714, 298 N.W. 549 (1941).
83 Shulse v. City of Mayville, 283 Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 642 (1937); Appalachian
Electric Power Co. v. City of Huntington, 115 W. Va. 588, 177 S.E. 431 (1934).
That there is a duty on the municipality to do equity, see Ogren v. Chrystal
Springs School Dist. No. 29, 52 N.D. 455,462, 203 N.W. 324, 326 (1925). If the
proceeds of a void contract can be traced or identified, the plaintiff may re-
cover by means of a constructive trust or an equitable lien. Floyd County v.
Owego Bridge Co., 143 Ky. 693, 137 S.W. 237 (1911) (plaintiff allowed to re-
move bridge under void contract); Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 578 (1940).
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has been held that the restriction applied equally to quasi
contracts.38
Violations of statutory requirements which have been held
to forbid recovery in quasi contract include: failure to post a
contractor's bond,3 7 failure to put the contract in writing,3 8
and failure to pass an ordinance authorizing the contract.30
Failure to comply with the lowest bid statute has in some cases
been considered only malum prohibitum and not prohibitive
of quasi contract recovery' 0 as has a statute requiring that a
record of yeas and nays be maintained. 4 1 It is fundamental
that rules of equity will be applied where the municipality is
sought to be bound by a contract entered into in an informal
manner.
The confusion manifest in municipal quasi contracts has
prompted the view that implied ratification and equitable
estoppel should be eliminated from the law of municipal cor-
porations and that quasi contract should be the exclusive
remedy in such cases.4
2
SUMMARY
The general reason advanced for refusing recovery is that
protection of the taxpayer is foregone in allowing such re-
covery. This public policy argument that the taxpayer is en-
titled to the protection of the constitutional and statutory
restrictions should not be lost sight of, yet in the light of ex-
panding municipal business activities, the business man who
deals with the municipality should not be made a contributor
to the corporation's unjust enrichment. Where there is a con-
travention of mandatory statutes, recovery would have the
effect of allowing the corporation to do indirectly that which it
36 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Ohio 219, 62 N.E. 127 (1901). Minnesota has
adopted the liberal view that recovery may be allowed though competitive bid-
ding requirements are not complied with. Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 45 (1950).
37 Mackey v. Columbus Twp., 71 Mich. 227, 38 N.W. 899 (1888).
38 Leland v. School Dist. No. 28, 77 Minn. 469, 80 N.W. 354 (1899). Contra:
Gas Light Co. v. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 612, 80 S.W. 25 (1894).
39Paul v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 294, 82 Pac. 601 (1905). Contra: McGuire v.
Rapid City, 6 Dak. 346, 43 N.W. 706 (1889).
40 Smith v. Town of Vinton, 43 So.2d 18 (La.1949).
41 Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 17 N.E. 587 (1888).
42 34 Minn. L. Rev. 46, 56 (1950). This article attacks the mandatory and di-
rectory and governmental and proprietary idistinctions and argues that the
question is really one of the relative weights of interest of the public and the
injustice of non-recovery.
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cannot do directly.43 Thus there has been the counterplay of
the two interests, namely, that of safeguarding the taxpayer
from the costs of improper municipal contracts, as opposed
to the inequities of a municipality being enriched at another's
expense.44
The majority of decisions place the municipality under the
same obligation to do justice as a private corporation where
there is not an abrogation of a public safeguard and hold that
wherever possible restitution in value should be made."5 Under
this principle municipal corporations, in part to protect the
credit of the municipality, like a private corporation or indi-
vidual, should be compelled to do justice and equity,"6 but only
within the bounds established to protect the municipality.
OIL AND GAS - SURVEY OF RIGHTS UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES
THE EXCEPTIONAL physical properties of oil and gas are re-
flected in the manner in which courts have created the law
which governs them. Recent developnients in the search of
oil and gas in North Dakota and the resultant leasing of oil,
gas and mineral rights in much of the state's real property
have led many property owners to attempt to classify the
legal rights of the parties arising under this special type of
lease.
43 Barnard v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N.E. 384 (1925) (protection of tax-
payers demanded strict construction); McCurdy v. Shiawassee County, 154
Mich. 550, 118 N.W. 625 (1908). See Village of Harvey v. Wilson, 78 Ill. App.
544 (1898) for an example of a statutory safeguard made meaningless.
44 The trend is toward allowance of quasi contract recovery in a greater num-
ber of situations. See Note, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 855, 858 (1938).
45 First Nat. Bank of Goodhue v. Village of Goodhue, 120 Minn. 362, 139 N.W.
599 (1913) (criticized in 16 Va. L. Rv. 628, 635 (1930) for allowing recovery
when loan was made without prior voter authorization required and also where
the president of the council was an official in the loaning bank). "As against in-
dividuals the law implies a promise to pay in such cases and the implication ex-
tends equally to corporations." San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal.
453 (1858). o
4s"Equity properly recognizes that a municipal corporation should not be
permitted to take the property of another, and receive the benefits thereof, and
thus be enriched through the loss of another without compensation." Bartelson
v. International School Dist., 43 N.D. 253, 256, 174 N.W. 78, 79 (1919). Accord:
Pimentel v. City of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351 (1863) ("The city is not excepted
from the common obligation to do justice which binds individuals"); Iverson
v. Williams School Dist., 42 N.D. 622, 172 N.W. 818 (1919).
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